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Abstract 
Sloman’s view largely reverses the usual view of Giidel’s sentence. But Sloman does not have 
good arguments for his basic theses: that the Godel sentence does not mean what it is commonly 
taken to mean, and that we can’t say that it is true in the intended model. The reason for Sloman’s 
reversal of perspective is his high-level point of view, from which relevant levels of structure in 
the formal system, its Giidel sentence and its models are not visible. 
1. Introduction 
In his review [ 61 of Penrose’s view of Godel’s theorems [4], Sloman argues that 
the Gijdel sentence does not mean what it seems to mean and that we can’t say that 
it is true in the intended model. These claims can be seen to be misguided by seeing 
the formal system, its Giidel sentence and its models in some more detail than Sloman 
does. This is worth doing because Sloman’s view tends to invert the usual view of 
Giidel’s sentence. For another kind of interesting misconception of Godel’s sentence, its 
supposed concealment of an infinite regress, see [ 81. 
Sloman’s view of Giidel’s sentence might be summarized like this: we think it’s true, 
because we think it means something in the meta-language, but it doesn’t, because it’s 
not always true. The following is a more detailed analysis of Sloman’s position. 
2. The Giidel sentence means what it seems to mean 
Sloman claims that the Gijdel sentence “does not have the meaning it is commonly 
taken to have” (p. 385)) namely the assertion of its own unprovability. He does not 
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present any explicit argument for this claim, apart from rhetorical denial and a par- 
enthetical suggestion, which will be examined later, along with an apparent implicit 
argument. On the rhetorical side, discussing Godel numbers, Sloman simply declares 
that “k is, after all, just a numeral: it denotes a number, not a formula” (p. 386). 
He does not say what this “after all” is supposed to cover, but leaves it at that 
and repeats analogous statements for predicates and sentences: the predicate in the 
Godel sentence “is a complex arithmetical predicate about numbers, not a predicate 
concerned with the derivability of formulas”, and the Giidel sentence “is merely an 
assertion about numbers” (p. 386). This denial of the role of the Giidel code, be- 
sides being uncalled for, is also not very carefully stated: discussing the relationship 
between arithmetical and meta-arithmetical meaning, Sloman sometimes represents the 
meta-arithmetical meaning as being additional to the arithmetical one, sometimes as 
being separate from it, and non-existent, and sometimes as excluding the arithmeti- 
cal one. Sloman mentions the first, standard variant, when he considers the predicate 
in the Godel sentence as “expressing not just a property of numbers but a syntac- 
tic property of formulas in F” (p. 385), but replaces it with the second variant, 
present in the quotations above. The third, most unusual variant, appears when Slo- 
man considers the statement that the numeral “k” denotes not the number k but the 
corresponding formula (p. 385). This variant, and the intermediate one according to 
which the meta-arithmetical meaning is the primary one, would make G(F) paradoxi- 
cal and actually prevent the proof of Godel’s theorem, as Varga notes, citing Kutchera 
[71. 
On the implicit side, Sloman says that his “argument that G(F) does not have the 
meaning it is commonly taken to have depends on the fact that because neither G(F) 
nor its negation can be derived in F, F will have some models in which G(F) is true 
and some in which it is false” (p. 385). Sloman does not say how his argument depends 
on that fact, nor what the argument is, but the suggestion seems to be that G(F) means 
something else in those models of F in which it is false. Strictly speaking, this is true, 
but the difference in the meaning of G(F) in those models in which it is false comes 
from the difference in those models themselves, namely the difference in the domain 
of the quantification through which G(F) says of itself that it has no proof. This basic 
meta-arithmetical meaning remains constant across models, and it is this meaning which 
enables us to understand why G(F) is false in some models. It thus makes much more 
sense to turn Sloman’s thesis around and say that it is because G(F) does have the 
meaning it is commonly taken to have that it is false in some models of F. 
The nature of those models of F in which G(F) is false is already clear from [2], to 
which Sloman refers, where Hofstadter discusses the possibility of extending F with the 
negation of G(F) [ 2, pp. 452-4561. This possibility is better understood if the deductive 
structure of F and the logical form of G( F) are seen in some more detail, using a couple 
of omega-notions. First, a system is called w-incomplete if, for some predicate P, P(n) 
is provable for all n, where n is the numeral of the number n, although VX P(x) is not 
provable. Giidel’s theorem involves this kind of incompleteness, with the predicate of 
unprovability in the role of P : G(F) , which is equivalent to Vlx -pr( x, g), where g is 
the numeral of its Giidel number, is not provable, if the system is consistent, but all its 
particular instances -pr(n,g) are provable, for all n. 
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The second omega-notion is that of w-inconsistency: a system is w-inconsistent if 
P(n) is provable for all n, and yet 3x TP (x) is also provable, for some predicate P; if 
there is no such predicate, the system is w-consistent. It follows from Godel’s theorem 
that if F is w-consistent, then -G(F), equivalent to 3x pr( x, g), is also not provable 
in F. Since w-consistency entails simple consistency, neither G(F) nor -G(F) can be 
proved if F is o-consistent. In that case, F can be consistently extended by adding 
lG( F) as a new axiom. But since a consistent F is o-incomplete, the new system 
F + lG( F) is w-inconsistent: all instances of lpr(n, g) are provable, along with the 
new axiom 3x pr( x, g). If such a system is to have a model, that model must contain, 
in addition to the natural numbers, some other, non-finite number, which would make 
3x pr( x, g) true. Such a number could be thought of as the number of some infinite 
proof of G(F). 
Returning now to Sloman’s argument: if G(F) is false in a model of F, that model is 
a model of lG( F), and so a model of F + lG( F) . In this model, G(F) = Vx pr( x, g) 
says that it has no proof (whatsoever, not even an infinite one), and so is false, because 
it does have one, since lG( F) = 3x pr(x, g) says so. 
This situation may seem a little strange: “if -G(F) says that G(F) is provable, and 
-G(F) is provable, then G(F) should also be provable”. And in general, “if you prove 
that something is provable, then it should be provable”. But this is actually not so: a 
meta-proof is not proof enough. This point may be easier to consider if the notation is 
simplified a little, writing just pr(G) for TG(F) = 3x pr(x,g), and G for G(F). The 
argument would then be that pr(G) entails G, but it does not do so: the implication 
pr(G) 4 G is not provable, because the implication pr(p) + p is provable only 
for provable sentences p. This is a statement of Lob’s theorem [ 1, p. 1871, which is 
equivalent to Giidel’s second theorem; the implication pr(p) -+ p is called the principle 
of reflection (of the meta-theory in the theory). 
Sloman does have one explicit, though hypothetical (and parenthetical) argument for 
his reduction of the meaning of the Godel sentence to the numerical, purely arithmetical 
one. He suggests that “perhaps it will turn out, in some of the ‘non-standard’ models that 
make G(F) false, that the assumed mapping between complex arithmetical expressions 
and meta-linguistic statements about F goes awry” (p. 386). But there is no independent 
reason to think that the Godel code could “go awry” in any model of F + lG( F), or 
anywhere else; on the contrary, there is reason to think that it does not, since that can 
explain how G(F) is false in such models. 
It should be added that the same observations about the falsity of the Godel sentence 
in some models apply to Rosser’s variation on Godel’s sentence, which Sloman does not 
consider. Rosser’s sentence says of itself that if it has a proof, it has an even shorter refu- 
tation. For such a sentence, simple consistency is enough both for its own unprovability 
and for the unprovability of its negation. Sloman actually discusses Godel’s sentence as 
if it were Rosser’s, and does not mention w-consistency (except, parenthetically, in his 
introductory statement of Giidel’s theorem on p. 383, and once again on p. 386). 
Finally, a point of terminology: Sloman says that those models of F in which G(F) 
is false are sometimes called “non-standard’ (p. 385). Such models are of course non- 
standard in the descriptive sense of the word, but not in its technical sense. Non-standard 
models do not change but, on the contrary, preserve the truth-values of statements in the 
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standard model, although they are not isomorphic to it [ 3, p. 2031, [ 1, p. 1931. So, in 
non-standard models of F, G(F) is actually (still) true. 
3. The Giidel sentence is true in the intended model 
The standard proof that G(F) is true in the domain of natural numbers goes by way of 
w-incompleteness: while G(F) = Vx Tpr(x, g) is not provable, if F is consistent, all its 
particular instances lpr(n,g) are provable. These instances are thus true in the domain 
of natural numbers, which means that the general statement G(F) is also true in it [ 5, p. 
11.51. But Sloman is not satisfied with such a proof, and does not accept Penrose’s more 
informal “seeing” that G(F) is true because what it says (that it is not provable) is so 
(if F is consistent). The reason is that Sloman questions the possibility of specifying 
exactly the notion of natural numbers which is used in the proof and in Penrose’s 
“seeing” that G(F) is true: “how are we supposed to grasp which model we are talking 
about? How can we unambiguously identify this infinite set?’ (p. 387). The reason 
for this insistence on uniqueness seems to be Sloman’s belief that “unless the semantic 
properties of F somehow uniquely determine which (infinite) model is being talked 
about . . . they cannot uniquely determine the truth-values of all the formulas expressible 
in F” (p. 385). But this is not so, and Sloman is much too strict in this insistence 
on uniqueness: the natural numbers do not have to be unambiguously identified, since 
much ambiguity is harmless. Models of natural numbers can be multiple if they are 
isomorphic, and even if they are not, provided they are non-standard in the standard 
sense of the term. Literally speaking, ambiguity is unavoidable since no satisfiable set 
of sentences has exactly one model [ 1, p. 191 I. 
Sloman is also concerned with the ambiguity between standard and (what he calls) 
non-standard models of F, in which G(F) is false. Sloman almost seems to be asking: 
“how do we know exactly what the standard model is if the best way of specifying it, 
namely F itself, is ambiguous?’ Since F has both standard and (what Sloman calls) 
non-standard models, it cannot be used to specify the standard, intended model. Sloman 
concludes that “F can be ‘seen’ to be true only if there is some means, other than F, 
of specifying which model is in question” (p. 385). “Until it is demonstrated that we 
do have some way of completely specifying exactly which infinite set we are talking 
about as a model of F it is not the case that we can claim to have seen that G(F) is 
true: for it will actually be false in some models of F and we have no basis for saying 
that our grasp of the ‘intended’ model rules this out” (p. 388). But we do have some 
basis for saying this, and Sloman himself mentions it when he talks about “our intuitive 
grasp of the natural number series, containing 0 and all its successors” (p. 387). The 
non-finite numbers which appear in those models of F in which G(F) is false are not 
natural according to this informal specification, since they are not successors of 0 in 
any intuitive, but only in a formal sense. However, such numbers appear already in 
non-standard models proper, those which are not isomorphic to the standard one but 
nevertheless preserve the truth-values of all statements [ 1, p. 1951. Thus, our concept 
of the intended model and those which are much less or even not intended is better 
than Sloman thinks, and does not have the weakness which he thinks it has (“too 
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many models”). But it is conceivable that it has another, opposite weakness (“too few 
models”), which would even, on the face of it, support Sloman’s position, though for 
a very different reason: it may be that we can’t say that G(F) is true in the intended 
model because that model may not actually be a model. That would be the case if every 
consistent formalization of number theory were w-inconsistent [ 2, p. 4591. 
4. Conclusion 
Sloman’s theses that the Godel sentence does not mean what it seems to mean and 
that we can’t say that it is true in the intended model are misguided. If Sloman’s view 
of Godel’s sentence is confronted with the standard view, this view explains away the 
arguments on which Sloman’s view is based. 
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